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Case No. 20150750-CA
INTHE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

JUSTIN PAUL CRAFT,

Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for aggravated robbery and
aggravated burglary, both first degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)G) (West Supp. 2012).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for, either
singularly or cumulatively:
(A) not objecting to the victim's eyewitness identifications of
Defendant; and

(B) not objecting or moving for a mistrial when Detective
Torres made an isolated and out of context statement placing
Defendant at the scene of the crime. 1

Standard of Review. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for
the first time on appeal are reviewed for correctness. State v. Fowers, 2011
UT App 383, if 15, 265 P.3d 832. This Court reverses for cumulative error if
"the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines [its] confidence ...
that a fair trial was had."

State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, if25, 999 P.2d 7

(quotations and citation omitted).
2. Whether the jury had sufficient evidence to convict Defendant of
aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, where the victim provided a
description of one of the perpetrators that matched Defendant and
identified Defendant, and where Defendant made a telephone call from jail
implicating himself in the crime.

Standard of Review. Defendant did not preserve this issue, so this
Court reviews for plain error. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,

,r 11, 10 P.3d 346.

Under plain error review, this Court will reverse only if the evidence and
inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's
verdict, "is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that
1

Defendant identifies these as issues 1, 2 and 3.
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reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime" for which he was convicted and if the
"evidentiary defect was so obvious and fundamental that it was plain error
to submit the case to the jury." Id. at ,r 18 (citation and additional quotation
marks omitted).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are
reproduced in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-6-203 (West 2015)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2015)2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Factual Summary.

The Robbery of Ray Davis and His Mother
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on March 12, 2013, three men entered a
bungalow located on Westminster Avenue in Sugar House.

R392, 544.

Alexander Ray Davis ("Davis") and his mother Kristin Ane Kirby ("Kirby")
were living in the house. R392, 394. Davis was asleep in his bedroom in the
basement of the house when he awoke to two men "punching me in the
face, both with guns pointing at my head, and then I got pistol whipped."

2

Unless otherwise noted, the State cites to the current versions of the

Code.

-3-

R393, 395. Although Davis was still waking up when he got punched, he

was awake by the thne of the pistol whipping and was able to witness it.
R409. Davis had turned out the lights in his room before he went to bed,

but the men had turned on the lights before they started beating him. R411.
The men pulled Davis off his bed and onto the floor. R398. Then,
while one of the men held Davis at gunpoint, the other searched the
bedroom. R399. They repeatedly demanded that Davis tell them where the
safe was located. R397. The men were wearing black clothing and black ski
masks, so that only their eyes were visible. R397. From the skin around
their eyes, Davis was able to tell that "[o ]ne was a darker skin, and one was
white." R398. The men took from Davis's bedroom his cell phone, wallet,
iPad, 1-facBook Air computer, and the keys to his car. R402, 432-33. They
held Davis down on the floor of his room at gunpoint for five to ten
minutes. Id.
After the two men searched Davis's room, they brought him out into
the living area downstairs and put him down "in a sacrificial position."
R400.

Davis described the sacrificial position as "the knees down, head

down, hands over my head[.]"

Id.

His fingers were interlaced and his

hands were up behind his back. R401. The men kept asking about the safe.
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Id. The darker skinned man kept Davis down at gunpoint and the white
man searched the living area. Id.
After exiting the bedroom, the white man took off his ski mask and
Davis could then clearly see his face. R401-02, 412. While he was in the
living area, Davis could see the gun the darker skinned man was pointing at
him, even though he was in the sacrificial position, because the man was
standing in front of him and he could still look around. R412-13. The white
man was in Davis's peripheral vision while they were in the living area.
R415.
In the meantime, Davis's mother, Kirby, was awakened by the third
man shining a flashlight into her eyes. R424-25. She was able to see a
masked man pointing a gun in her face. R425. He had black short hair and
a big round face. R426. He asked Kirby where her purse and jewelry were.

Id. The man then took her iPad, cell phone from her room, and the keys to
her car. R427, 432-33. After less than ten minutes, the man took Kirby
downstairs.

R427-28.

To go downstairs, Kirby had to go through the

kitchen, which was dark.

R437.

As she was walking down the stairs,

however, Kirby could see into the living area. R428. She was able to see
because a light was on in an open closet: "there was enough light that the
whole room was very well visible to the eye." R428, 437-38. She saw Davis
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on the floor with a man pointing a gun at him. R428. Although she could
see movement in the closet with the light on, she never saw the man who
was inside. R428, 438-39.
While being held in the living area, Davis could see the third man
bringing Kirby down the stairs. R405. Davis described the third man as
shorter, heavier, and darker-skinned. Id. He was also wearing all black
with a black ski mask. Id. The men put his mother in the same sacrificial
position he was in and the third man kept a gun trained on her. R405, 42930. After being brought downstaires, Kirby saw that Davis's whole face was
bloodied. R431, 439. Next, the men shut off all the lights and turned on
flashlights. R405. The three men started "slowly walking up the stairs,
blinding us 1.-vith their lights, told us they have all of our information, they
have our wallets, they have everything, if we ever try to say anything, they
will come find us." Id.
Apprehension of the Robbery Suspects
After the men left, Davis and his mother ran to a neighbor's house
and called the police. R405. The police arrived about five minutes later.
R406. Davis provided a description of one of the perpetrators as "male,
white, with reddish-brown hair and a goatee." R572. K9 officers searched
the area but were unable to locate a track.
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R444-45.

An officer did,

however, recover the two cell phones belonging to Davis and Kirby, as well
as Davis's wallet, three blocks north of their residence. R407-08, 446-48, 47274.
When one of the officers heard that electronic devices had been
stolen, he asked Davis whether he had the ability to track any of them
through a GPS system. R446. Davis remembered that the men took his iPad
which had 3G cellular service and could therefore be tracked. R407. The
police tracked the iPad to a trailer park near Harrison Avenue. R448-49.
When officers arrived at the trailer park area, they observed at least two
people running toward the trailers. R481-82. Although the officers shouted
at the individuals to stop, they ran between two trailers and disappeared
into trailer 14. R483, 485. The officers waited next to trailer 14 for more
officers to arrive to contain the area. R486. The officers then began ordering
individuals out of the trailer one at a time. R451-52, 487. A total of seven
people emerged from the trailer, including Defendant (SE41), Desmond
Redkettle (SE40), and Jayvaughn Firethunder (SE39). R529-30.
A silver PT Cruiser belonging to Redkettle was parked next to trailer
14.

R452-53, 458.

The officers who searched it discovered a bag of

marijuana, a holster, a mask, a backpack, and a G. Loomis bag. R453, 459,
461-62. The backpack contained an iPad, a flashlight, and a set of keys.
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R461-62. The G. Loomis bag contained "[s]everal bags of marihuana," video

games, and a jacket. R462. Officers also discovered a Sig Sauer 9mm pistol
and 9mm bullets in the car. R462-63. 3

Victim's Identification of Defendant
After the police left Davis's house, Davis and his mother went to the
hospital so that Davis could be treated for his head wounds. R410, 419-20.
After receiving some ten stitches, Davis and his mother returned home for a
short while and then went to the police station at approximately 9:00 that
morning. R418, 434-35, 531. 4 Detective Torres interviewed Davis after he
arrived at the police station. R418, 531. When asked whether the men had
any identifying features, Davis said that one of the perpetrators was white
and had reddish brown hair and a goatee-a description that matched
Defendant, who had already become a suspect. R544, 576-77.

Police also searched the trailer and discovered "drug packaging
materials, drug paraphernalia, a large bag of marijuana, a MacBook Air
computer, and a handgun holster." R137. But the evidence found inside
the trailer was excluded at trial because police had not obtained a search
warrant. R137-43.
3

When asked when he was interviewed by police, Davis replied that
it was the "next day or the day after that." R421. Davis's mother, however,
remembered going to the police station around 9:00 a.m. on the same day as
the crime. R434-35. Detective Torres also testified that he conducted the
interview and lineup with Davis around 9:00 a.m. on the same day as the
crime. R531.
4
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By the time Davis and his mother arrived at the police station,
Detective Torres had identified

three robbery suspects:

Redkettle,

Firethunder, and Defendant. R531-32. Detective Torres prepared a photo
array of six men that included a color photograph of Defendant and color
photographs of five other men that closely resembled Defendant's
photograph. R418, 540-41. Although Detective Torres usually had another
detective review the photo lineup, he did not document having done so in
this case. Id.
Detective Torres showed Davis the photo array sometime between
9:00 and 10:00 that morning-seven to eight hours after the 2:00 a.m.
robbery. R544.

Although Detective Torres interviewed Davis before

administering the lineup, he did not obtain a written witness statement
before the photo lineup.

R543.

And before administering the lineup,

Detective Torres told Davis that he should be certain before identifying
anyone. R545.
Detective Torres showed Davis the photos sequentially- one at a
time, until Davis said yes to one of them. R418, 540. Detective Torres then
continued showing the rest of the photos, and let Davis review them. Id.
Davis went through all the photos once before stating that Defendant
looked familiar. R546. When Detective Torres asked Davis whether the
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man he identified was the man standing by his bed, Davis replied yes. Id. 5
Detective Torres did not ask Davis about the "level of certainty" in his
identification. R545.
At approximately 4:00 p.m. the same day, Firethunder, Redkettle, and
Defendant were formally arrested. R532.
Defendant's Admissions in a Phone Call from Jail

Five days after his arrest, on March 17, Defendant made a telephone
call from the jail to an unidentified woman who promptly started giving
Defendant "a hard time" for messing up.

R535-537, 553-54; SE43 (CD

Davis testified that before coming into the police station, he saw a
police report on the news about the incident at his house, including pictures
of the suspects. R410, 418. But Detective Torres, who interviewed Davis
and conducted the photo lineup, testified that information concerning the
suspects would not have been released to the media until a formal arrest
had been made, and that did not occur until later that same day. R532.
According to Detective Torres, "I don't know how the media got the
pictures of the suspects or the arrested parties, but it had to have been later
on that day because we wouldn't have released any information as far as
who we had in custody." R533. Detective Torres was confident that the
arrests would not have occurred until after his interview with Davis, and
after Davis viewed the photo lineup. Id.
5
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®

recording of jail phone call). 6 Defendant responded that he knew he had
messed up and said "I'm probably going to do a nickel."

R.538.

That

conversation included the following incriminating exchange:
Female voice: "Dude, that's fucked up though man. I fucking
feel for you. I'm so mad at you."
Male voice: "I guess my homeboys - my homeboys are a little
crazy man. Fucking I told 'em to leave all the electronics,
'don't-don't touch nothing like that.' 'Leave it."'
SE43:00:35-00:45.
At one point during the conversation, the unidentified woman talked
about "Ashley" and asked Defendant if he wanted to talk to her.

R554.

Detective Torres assumed that Ashley was Ashley Drake, one of the women
found in trailer 14. R530, 554. 7 It sounded like the unidentified women
called Ashley from another phone and put the two phones together so that
Defendant could talk to Ashley. Id. But they could not really understand
each other so Ashley just "relayed a quick message" to Defendant.

Id.

All phone calls made from the jail are recorded, and the information
stored includes the inmate's number and name, the date and time of the
call, the length of the call, and the phone number called. R534. Regarding
this particular call, the caller was identified as Defendant through a
recording of Defendant saying his name, and the stored information which
recorded his inmate number. R536-37, 553. The CD recording was admitted
into evidence as State's Exhibit 43, not State's Exhibit 23. See Aplt. Br. 17 n.6.
6

This portion of the call was not included in the CD recording of the
jail phone call admitted into evidence as State's Exhibit 43. However, it was
testified to by Detective Torres.
7
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During this exchange, the three discussed what happened at the trailer
park. Id.
B.

Summary of relevant trial proceedings.

The State charged Defendant, Redkettle, and Firethunder with
aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, both first degree felonies. Rl5, 252-53. On Defendant's motion, the trial court severed Defendant's trial
from those of his co-defendants and ruled that the admissions of Redkettle
and Firethunder "cannot be admitted as evidence in the trial of Mr. Craft."
R46, 70-71.

Motion for Directed Verdict
Following the close of the State's case, Defendant's trial counsel made
a motion for a directed verdict "just on the basis that they haven't shown the
standard required of directed verdict that my client is the one that
committed these crimes. And I'll submit it on that." R558. The judge denied
the motion, explaining that "Mr. Davis testified and identified [Defendant]
as the person being there. That is enough to take it to the jury, to allow
reasonable minds to consider whether or not to find him guilty." Id.
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Defendant's Eyewitness Identification Expert Witness
The defense called one witness: Dr. David Dodd, a doctor of
psychology in the Deparhnent of Psychology at the University of Utah.
R183, 561-62. Dodd testified that Davis's eyewitness identifications were

not reliable. R563-79. He gave seven primary reasons. First, Dodd testified
that in general it takes several minutes to get sufficient information to later
remember a face. R566. He conceded, however, that an identification can
sometimes be made within less than a minute. Id. Second, Dodd testified
that people do not do well at acquiring information to create a memory
when they are stressed. Id. Dodd believed that Davis would have been
sufficiently stressed by the circmnstances of the robbery to have his mental
processes disrupted. R567. Third, Dodd described a phenomenon called
"weapon focus" -"when people are confronted with a weapon, they are
likely to spend a good part of their time looking at the weapon and less of
their time looking at the person." Id. As Davis had a gun pointed at him
during the robbery, this would have negatively affected his ability to
remember a person. R567-68. Fourth, Dodd testified that Davis would have
spent less time looking at any one perpetrator because his attention would
have been divided among all the perpetrators in the room. R568. Fifth,
Dodd suggested that Davis's men1ories of the event would have been
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diminished during the seven or eight hours that elapsed between the event
and the photo lineup. R568. Sixth, Dodd commented on the limited nature
of Davis's description of the suspect.

R569.

Davis never provided

information on the age of the perpetrator, and he described reddish-brown
hair which did not appear in any of the people in the photo lineup. Id.
Seventh, Dodd suggested that Davis's memory of Defepdant may have been
the result of "very subtle sorts of suggestion" that occurred after the event
itself and prior to the photo lineup. Id.
Dodd also discussed how various aspects of the photo array
conducted by Detective Torres did not conform with the recommendations
contained in a 1999 publication entitled National Institute of Justice, the US

Department of Justice, the Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement.
R570-71.

For example, Detective Torres did not tell Davis that the

perpetrator might or might not be in the photo lineup, R571; he did not tell
Davis that the police would continue to investigate whether or not Davis
picked anyone out, id.; there should have been more detailed interviews and
reports right after the crime took place, R571; Detective Torres did not ask
Davis about his degree of certainty in identifying Defendant, R573; Davis
should have been required to make a yes or no determination after being
shown each photo, R574; and Detective Torres should have used a double
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blind procedure, where the officer presenting the photos does not know
which person is the suspect, R574-75. But Dodd also acknowledged that the
administration of the photo array had positive aspects, including the
selection of appropriate photos for the other five people used in the photo
lineup based on Davis's description of the perpetrator as an individual with
reddish-brownish hair and a goatee, and the use of a sequential procedure.
R576-77.
Verdict, Sentencing, and Appeal

Following the two-day trial, a jury returned a guilty verdict on both
charges.

R242-43, 250-51, 257-58.

Defendant was sentenced to an

indeterminate prison term of not less than ten years to life for each count,
·with both counts to run concurrently to each other. R278-81. Defendant
timely appealed. R282.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Defendant has not carried his burden of establishing that his trial

counsel performed deficiently in not moving to suppress Davis's eyewitness
identifications of Defendant. To be deficient, counsel's performance must
be objectively unreasonable;

Defendant cannot establish that counsel's

strategic decision to rely on the testimony of the expert witness to discredit
the eyewih1ess identifications was objectively unreasonable.
counsel

is

not required

to

move for

Defense

suppression of eyewitness

identifications in every case, and in this case, given the likely futility of such
a motion, defense counsel could reasonably choose to rely on a strategy of
challenging the reliability of the eyewitness identifications.
Further, Defendant cannot establish prejudice arising from the
alleged deficiency in light of the other inculpa tory evidence in the record.
Even absent the victim's identification of Defendant, a different outcome is
not reasonably likely given Defendant's admission during the jail phone
call, together with the fact that Defendant was the only individual found in
trailer 14 who matched Davis's description of his assailant.
2. Defendant also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not
objecting or moving for a mistrial when Detective Torres, asked if there
were other factors that guided him in selecting the photographs to put in
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the lineup, responded "[a]s far as the other two defendants saying he was
there." Defendant cannot establish deficient performance as trial counsel's
not objecting is entirely consistent with a strategic determination that
objecting would simply draw more attention to the statement.

Similarly,

trial counsel's not moving for a mistrial is entirely consistent with a strategic
determination that the court would not likely have granted a mistrial, and
that requesting one would simply have drawn unwarranted attention to the
remark.

Further, Defendant cannot establish prejudice as there is no

reasonable likelihood that Detective Torres's brief and isolated remark so
influenced the jury that it would have acquitted Defendant had trial counsel
successfully moved to exclude the statement. Finally, Detective Torres's
isolated statement could not have been prejudicial in light of the other
inculpatory evidence in the record.
3. Defendant cannot establish that the alleged instances of deficient
performance, even if not sufficiently prejudicial on their own, were
cumulatively prejudicial. This Court reverses for cumulative error only if
the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines its confidence that a
fair trial was had. Here, there was no prejudicial error-either individually
or cumulatively.
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4. Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that
he was one of the perpeh·ators of the March 12 crime. Defendant's argument
fails for two reasons.

First, defense counsel's perfunctory and general

motion for a directed verdict did not preserve his appellate challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his aggravated robbery and
aggravated burglary convictions, and Defendant has not adequately briefed
the plain error exception to the preservation rule.
Second, even if Defendant's briefing of this issue were adequate, he
could not show plain error because he cannot establish that the evidence
was insufficient to support his convictions, much less that any insufficiency
was obvious and fundamental. To the extent that Defendant challenges the
admissibility of Davis's eyewitness identifications rather than their
reliability once admitted, such a claim is improper in a sufficiency of the
evidence challenge. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to
the jury's verdict, Davis's description of Defendant as one of the
perpetrators, the jail phone call, and Davis's eyewitness identifications of
Defendant, all support Defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery and
aggravated burglary.
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ARGUMENT
I.
TRIAL COUNSEL
INEFFECTIVE

WAS

NOT

CONSTITUTIONALLY

Defendant argues that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in
two ways. First, he argues that trial counsel performed deficiently by not
moving for suppression of Davis's eyewitness identification of Defendant.
Aplt. Br. 19-32 (Defendant's point I). Second, Defendant argues that trial
counsel performed deficiently when he did not object or move for a mistrial
after Detective Torres mentioned that he included Defendant's photograph
in the photo array because the other two defendants said he was there.
Aplt. Br. 32-37 (Defendant's point II). However, Defendant has failed to
establish that his trial counsel performed deficiently in either case, nor has
he established that he suffered prejudice, either singularly, or cumulatively
(Defendant's point III, Aplt. Br. 37-38). His ineffective assistance of counsel
claims thus fail under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984).

***
To show ineffective assistance, Defendant must first demonstrate that
trial counsel performed deficiently- i.e., that even with the "strong
presumption that [trial] counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance," the challenged action was objectively
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unreasonable and could not be

II

considered sound trial strategy."'

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 689 (1984) (citation omitted); State v.
Gerber, 2015 UT App 76, if 9, 347 P.3d 852; State v. Daniels, 2014 UT App 230,
iflO, 336 P.3d 1074. This burden requires Defendant to demonstrate that
"there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." State v. Clark,
2004 UT 25,

,r 6, 89 P.3d 162 (emphasis in original)

omitted); see also Daniels, 2014 UT App 230, ,I9.

(quotations and citation
Defendant must put

forward affirmative proof. "It should go without saying that the absence of
evidence cannot overcome the 'strong presumption that counsel's conduct
[fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance."' Burt v.

Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 17 (2013) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
Defendant must also prove prejudice-i.e., absent counsel's deficient
performance, there is a reasonable probability that he would have received
a more favorable result below. See State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah
1998). Again, Defendant "bears the burden of establishing prejudice as a
demonstrable reality," and "the likelihood of a different result must be
substantial, not just conceivable." State v. McNeil, 2013 UT App 134, ,30,
302 P.3d 844 (quotations and citations omitted); see also Harrington v. Richter,
131 S. Ct. 770, 792 (2011). A reasonable probability is one "sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770,
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787 (2011) (quotations and citation omitted).

Thus, Defendant must do

more than show "that the errors had some conceivable effect on the
outcome of the proceeding." Id. He must show that the "likelihood of a
different result" is "substantial, not just conceivable." Id. at 792. 8
"The

failure

of

trial

strategy,

however,

does

not

indicate

ineffectiveness of counsel." State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 41, if 44, 48 P.3d 931. If
"there is a legitimate exercise of professional judgment in the choice of trial
strategy, the fact that it did not produce the expected result does not
Defendant suggests that the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard of scrutiny, applied to such constitutional violations as improperly
admitted eyewitness identifications and denial of the right to confront one's
accusers, should apply here in determining whether trial counsel's allegedly
deficient performances prejudiced Defendant. Aplt. Br. 30, 36. However,
the claim that the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard should be
applied when reviewing a claim of "constitutional dimension" under the
prejudice prong of ineffective assistance has already been rejected by this
court. See State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, ,r 17 n.1, 153 P.3d 804, 811
(stating that "[t]he harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard is
reserved for 'the few contexts where ineffective assistance is 'presumed,'
such as where counsel is either totally absent or prevented from assisting
the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding, ... and where counsel
is burdened by an actual conflict of interest") (citing Kimmelman v. Morrison,
477 U.S. 365, 381 n. 6, 106 S. Ct. 2574 (1986)); see also State v. Beckering, 2015
UT App 53, ,r 30, 346 P.3d 672, 679-80 (rejecting claim that "due to the
nature of the alleged jury instruction error, we should either presume
prejudice or require the State to establish lack of prejudice" and reiterating
that" [t]o show prejudice in the ineffective assistance of counsel context, the
defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel's errors actually had an
adverse effect on the defense and that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different") (internal citations omitted).
8
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constitute ineffectiveness of counsel." Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 524
(Utah 1994).

Thus, to prove Strickland prejudice, the "likelihood of a

different result must be substantial, not just conceivable." Harrington v.

Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 792 (2011).
If a defendant fails to establish either deficient performance or
prejudice, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails as a matter of
law. Gerber, 2015 UT App 76, if 9.
Defendant bears the added burden of assuring that the record is
adequate.

An "appellate court will presume that any argument of

ineffectiveness presented to it is supported by all the relevant evidence of
which [the] defendant is aware." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ,r,i 16-17, 12
P.3d 92. "VVhere the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities
or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a
finding that counsel performed effectively." Id.
A. Trial counsel's strategic decision not to challenge the
admissibility of the victim's eyewitness identifications of
Defendant was not objectively unreasonable.

Defendant argues

that his h·ial counsel was constitutionally

ineffective for not objecting to Davis's eyewitness identifications of
Defendant.

Defendant's claim fails under both prongs of the Strickland

analysis.
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1. Defendant cannot prove deficient performance on this
record.
Defendant argues that trial counsel's failure to object to Davis's
eyewitness identifications of Defendant was objectively unreasonable
because

the

identifications

were

unreliable

and

unconstitutionally

suggestive. Aplt. Br. 19-29. Although the record reflects that trial counsel
did not object to the admission of Davis's eyewitness identifications,
nothing in the record reveals why he did not do so, and Defendant has not
sought a rule 23B remand to establish record support for his claim that
counsel was ineffective in not seeking to exclude the eyewitness
identifications. See Utah R. App. P. 23(b).
Absent record evidence to the contrary, Strickland requires this Court
to presume that counsel reasonably decided not to move to suppress the
eyewitness identifications because he chose instead to call an eyewitness
identification expert witness, Dr. Dodd, to call the identification procedures
into question and relied on that testimony to argue that the eyewitness
identifications were unreliable. See R561-77 (Dr. Dodd's testimony), 614-16
(defense counsel arguing in closing that the eyewitness identifications were
unreliable).

Indeed, far from ignoring the issue of the reliability of the

eyewitness identifications, the only witness defense counsel called was Dr.
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Dodd, thereby making their unreliability a central aspect of the defense's
case.
Defendant focuses his argument on the state due process standard for
analyzing the admissibility of eyewitness identifications adopted by the
Utah Supreme Court in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 779-81 (Utah 1991).
See Aplt. Br. 19-29. However, the actual issue presented is one of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Because Strickland is grounded in reasonableness, it
asks only "whether an attorney's representation amount to incompetence
under 'prevailing professional norms', not whether it deviated from best
practices or 1nost common custom." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105
(2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). The Sixth Amendment creates
"no expectation that competent counsel will be a flawless strategist or
tactician." See id. at 791. Defendants "have a right to a competent lawyer,
but not to Clarence Darrow." United States v. Rezin, 322 F.3d 443 (7th Cir.
2003). Thus, the issue is not whether counsel correctly decided to forego a
suppression motion. Rather, the critical inquiry for resolving this ineffective
assistance claim is whether all reasonable attorneys would have moved to
suppress the eyewitness identifications. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. In
other words, was it is so clear that the eyewitness identifications did not
meet the Ramirez factors that all objectively reasonable counsel would have
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li.'..,

'C

moved to have them suppressed rather than call an expert witness to
address their reliability? In short, the answer is no.
Defendant has not proven that all reasonable counsel would have
moved to suppress Davis's eyewitness identifications rather than rely on a
strategy of challenging their reliability through the expert testimony of Dr.
Dodd. In Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778-84, the supreme court held that, as the
"gatekeeper[s ]" of admissible evidence, trial judges may hold a pretrial
hearing to determine whether an eyewitness identification is sufficiently
reliable to be admitted at h·ial. But while Ramirez clearly allows defense
counsel to request such a hearing, defense counsel may choose to forgo this
inquiry based on legitimate strategic reasons. In State v. Mecham, 2000 UT
App 247, 9 P.3d 777, this Court held that defense counsel was not ineffective
for affirmatively deciding not to request a pretrial Ramirez hearing and
instead "to wait and discredit the eyewitnesses' testimony during crossexamination, following up with a Long instruction." Id. at

,r,r

23-24. This

Court accepted the trial counsel's belief that such a hearing might actually
strengthen the State's case by giving the eyewitnesses a "chance to rehearse
their testimony and further solidify their identifications of the two
defendants." Id. at ,r 15.
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Similarly, in the instant case, defense counsel made a reasonable
strategic decision in not moving to suppress the eyewitness identifications
and instead challenging their reliability through the testimony of the expert
witness. As in Mecham, defense counsel could reasonably have concluded
that a Ramirez motion would have been futile. In Ramirez, the court listed
five "factors by which reliability must be determined" if there is a pretrial
objection:
(1) the opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the
event; (2) the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the
time of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to observe the
event, including his or her physical and mental acuity; (4)
whether the witness's identification was made spontaneously
and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being
observed and the likelihood that the witness would perceive,
remember, and relate it correctly.
817 P.2d at 781 (quotations and citation omitted).
Courts "need not, nor should they, step into the province of the jury
and decide. the ultimate matter of identification for the jurors."
Hubbard, 2002 UT 45,

,r

30, 48 P.3d 953.

State v.

Instead, courts simply decide

whether the testimony was "sufficiently reliable so as not to offend
defendant's right to due process by permitting clearly unreliable
identification testimony before the jury."

Id.

Thus, a court's only

responsibility is to "initially screen, under a totality of the circumstances

-26-

standard, the eyewitness testimony so that it is sufficiently reliable as not to
offend a defendant's right to due process. The jury, on the other hand,
taking all presented evidence into consideration, determines whether to
believe the eyewitness's identification." State v. Guzman, 2006 UT 12,

,r

21,

133 P.3d 363.
Under the foregoing, it would be a rare case in which a trial court
would take the extraordinary step of excluding eyewitness identification
testimony from a jury. Ramirez itself is a case in point. In Ramirez, two
masked robbers, one armed with a pipe and the other with a gun, attacked a
restaurant manager and her two male companions at night, in a dimly-lit
parking lot behind the restaurant. 817 P.2d at 776. While the manager and
one of her companions went back into the restaurant to retrieve the bank
deposit bag, a scuffle ensued outside between the eyewitness and the
robbers. Id. The robber with the pipe hit the eyewitness and instructed the
gunman to kill the eyewitness if he moved. Id. The eyewitness never saw
Ramirez's full face. Id. at 784. He later identified Ramirez as the gunman at
a "showup" held shortly after the crime where Ramirez-the only person
present who was not a police officer- was handcuffed to a fence and
illuminated with police spotlights. Id. at 777, 783-84.
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The Utah Supreme Court held that this identification was admissible
even though (1) the showup was "blatant[ly] suggestive[ ]," (2) the
witnessing conditions were relatively poor- Ramirez had worn a scarf that
covered most of his face and the witness viewed him for only '" a few
seconds' or 'a second' to 'a minute' or longer" at nighttime in the shadowy
area of a parking lot, with lighting described variously as "good" and as
"poor," and (3) neither of the other two victims could identify Ramirez. Id.
at 776, 782-84.
In State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 924, 926-27 (Utah App. 1998), this Court
similarly affirmed the admission of identification testimony, even though
the eyewitness had only seen the suspect for ten to fifteen seconds while the
eyewitness was travelling in a car on the freeway and being shot at. And in

State v. Hofjhine, 2001 UT 4, ilil 18-22, 20 P.3d 265, the supreme court held
that a trial court should have admitted testimony under Ramirez, even
though the eyewitness had viewed the suspect for twenty to thirty seconds
in the dark, and where the eyewitness's description of the suspect was off

by three inches.
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These cases amply demonstrate that an eyewitness's account need not
be error-free or distraction-free to be submitted to a jury. As explained in

Hubbard, 2002 UT 45,

,r

30, courts "cannot know for certain whether the

witnesses' attention was completely focused on identifying features of the
assailant, nor can we determine whether the witnesses were mentally and
physically sharp." But this does not change the permissive nature of the

Ramirez inquiry, because the question at that stage "is only whether the
proffered evidence is sufficiently reliable such that it can be presented to the
jury for their deliberation" without violating due process. Id.
In this case, a motion to suppress under Ramirez would have failed.
As a threshold matter, the identification procedures employed by Detective
Torres were not unnecessarily suggestive. 9 Ramirez, P.2d at 781 (quoting

The United States Supreme Court has established a two-step test for
analyzing the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence. Neil v.
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 197-99 (1972). As a threshold matter, a court must
determine whether law enforcement used an "unnecessarily suggestive"
identification procedure in obtaining the out-of-court identification. Id. If
not, the court's due process inquiry ends. See id. Only when officers
employ an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure does the court
proceed to step two - it must then determine "whether under the 'totality of
the circumstances' the identification was [sufficiently] reliable even though
the confrontation procedure [employed by officers] was suggestive." Id. at
199. In State v. Lujan, the State filed a petition for certiorari asking the Utah
Supreme Court to recognize that absent law enforcement misconduct
related to an identification procedure, there is no basis to proceed to the due
process question addressing the identification's reliability. See Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, State v. Lujan, Case no. 20150840-SC, at 9-12. In other
9
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Long, 721 P.2d at 493). In evaluating a photo array for suggestiveness, the
0

main question is whether the photo array emphasized the defendant's
photo over the others," i.e., whether officers administering the array-via
"words" or "body language" -conveyed "an attitude of disinterest,"
whether they manipulated the array "to indicate their belief that one of the
photos portrayed the perpetrator," or whether officers otherwise caused the
defendant's photo "to st[and] out." State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1111-12
(Utah 1994); see also State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84, ,I32 n.22, 223 P.3d 1103

(" Clopten I"); accord Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783 (citing Long, 721 P.2d at 494 n.8).
Other relevant factors include "the length of time between observation and
identification" and "the value of photo identifications compared to inperson identifications." Clopten I, 2009 UT 84, ,I32 n.22; accord Ramirez, 817
P.2d at 783 (citing Long, 721 P.2d at 494 n.8).
Here, Davis initially identified Defendant through a sequential, rather
than a simultaneous, photo lineup.

R418-19, 540.

Dr. Dodd expressly

approved of the use of sequential photo lineups. R573-74. The photo lineup
occurred just hours after the crime. R434-35, 531. Dr. Dodd did criticize
words, the State is asking the supreme court to clarify that a conditional
two-step analysis applies under both federal and state due process when
assessing the reliability of an allegedly tainted eyewih1ess identification.
The State has also asked this Court to follow the two-step analysis
governing eyewitness identifications in State v. Gallegos, Case no. 20140571CA, at 32-35; and State v. Aponte, case no. 20150154-CA, at 23-29.
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various other aspects of the photo lineup for not being in conformity with
the best practices recommendations contained in a 1999 publication entitled

National Institute of Justice, the US Department of Justice, the Eyewitness
Evidence: A Guide for Law Enforcement. R570-71. But, he also praised certain
aspects of the photo lineup, including the selection of appropriate photos
for the other five people used in the photo lineup based on Davis's
description of the perpetrator as an individual with reddish-brownish hair
and a goatee. R576-77. Further, Detective Torres's testimony suggests that
Davis misremembered seeing a police report on the news about the incident
at his house while he was at the hospital. R410, 418. Detective Torres was
certain that information concerning the suspects, including Defendant,
would not have been released to the media until a formal arrest had been
made, and that the arrests would not have occurred until after his interview
with Davis, including the photo lineup. R533. Thus, the photo lineup bore
no indicia of blatant suggestiveness.
Second, Davis's identifications of Defendant were "sufficiently
reliable so as not to offend due process." Hubbard, 2002 UT 45,

iJ 30. Davis's

identifications were at least as reliable as the identification in Ramirez.
Davis was able to observe Defendant's face after Defendant took off his ski
mask upon exiting the bedromn. R401-02, 412. There was sufficient light
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for Davis to be able to see- the perpetrators had previously turned on the
light in his bedroom, and there was light in the living area from the open
closet.

R411, 428, 437.

Although Defendant was in Davis's peripheral

vision during the time they were in the living area, Davis could still look
around and see what was happening from his sacrificial position on the
floor.

R413, 415.

While Defendant suggests that Davis's eyewitness

identifications were unreliable because he "received immunity for his
testimony which prevented him from facing drug charges" and lied during
trial "about the marijuana that he had in his house," Aplt. Br. 45, Davis's
initial eyewitness identification of Defendant during the photo lineup
occurred just hours after the crime, and there is no indication in the record
that he had been offered immunity at that time. See R393, 409 (generally
mentioning the immunity grant).

Clearly, any subsequent grant of

immunity or less than truthful trial testimony would not have affected his
prior identification of Defendant as one of the perpetrators.
Thus, trial counsel could have reasonably determined that, in view of
the likely futility of a Ramirez motion, a better strategy was to attack the
reliability of the eyewitness identification through Dr. Dodd' s expert
witness testimony. "It is generally inappropriate for a trial court to interfere
with counsel's conscious choices" about trial sh·ategy. State v. Litherland,
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2000 UT 76,

il 32, 12 P.3d 92. And although Defendant may argue that there

would have been no harm in moving to suppress the eyewitness
identifications as well as challenging their reliability through the testimony
of Dr. Dodd, counsel is not required to take every possible step in
formulating a trial strategy.

Rather, counsel is "entitled to formulate a

strategy that [is] reasonable at the time and to balance limited resources in
accord with effective h·ial tactics and strategies." Harrington v. Richter, 562
U.S. 86, 107 (2011) (quotations and citation omitted).
2. Defendant cannot prove prejudice on this record.

Defendant also cannot prove prejudice- that is, a reasonable
likelihood of a different result absent the alleged error.

As discussed, even

had trial counsel successfully moved to suppress the eyewitness
identifications, a different outcome was not reasonably likely
First, Davis provided a description of one of the perpetrators when he
was interviewed by police at his house shortly after the crime occurred,
stating that he was "male, white, with reddish-brown hair and a goatee."
R572. Defendant was the only individual found in trailer 14 who matched
the description given by Davis.

Compare R572 with SE 41.

Although

Defendant quibbles with the description of the color of his hair, saying it is
dark in the photograph compared with the "reddish-brown" description
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given by Davis, see Aplt. Br. 45, the color in the photo is close enough to
"reddish-brown" that Davis's description of the perpetrator could certainly
apply to Defendant. Moreover, although Defendant suggests that Davis's
description also fit another white male eventually found in the trailer,
Dustin Kilpack, this assertion is incorrect as Dustin Kilpack did not have a
goatee. See SE 42. In fact, none of the other individuals found in the trailer
had a goatee. See SE 36-42.
Second, there is the evidence of the phone call Defendant made from
jail on March 17, 2013, five days after the crime. First, Detective Torres's
testimony establishes that Defendant, and not another inmate, made the jail
phone call.

All phone calls made from the jail are recorded, and the

information stored includes the inmate's number and name, the date and
time of the call, the length of the call, and the phone number called. R534.
In the call at issue here, the caller was identified as Defendant through a
recording of Defendant saying his name, and the stored information which
recorded his inmate nmnber. R536-37, 553. Moreover, although Defendant
suggested that he could have made the call and then given the phone to
another inmate, Detective Torres stated that he had reviewed approximately
one and a half hours of Defendant's phone calls from jail, and that the
person in the March 17 phone call "was pretty much the same one as the
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other hour and a half of phone conversations." R539. Thus, the evidence
establishes that Defendant made the March 17 jail phone call.
Although Defendant attempts to minimize the inculpatory nature of
his jail phone call by calling it "ambiguous," he in fact tacitly confesses in
the call to being one of the perpetrators of the March 12 crime. When the
unidentified woman in the call started giving Defendant "a hard time" for
messing up, Defendant responded that he knew and said "I'm probably
going to do a nickel," thereby predicting that he is going to prison. R537-38.
He further acknowledges his own role in the crime by stating: "I guess my
homeboys-my homeboys are a little crazy man.

Fucking I told 'em to

leave all the electronics, 'don't-don't touch nothing like that.' 'Leave it."'
SE43: 00:35-00:45.

Defendant claims that this statement is ambiguous

because it "lacks any contextual information about who, what, when or why
it is being uttered." Aplt. Br. 47. However, there is in fact ample contextual
evidence linking Defendant's statement to the March 12 crime. Defendant
explicitly referenced his role in telling his "homeboys" to leave the
electronics, just five days after the commission of a crime which resulted in
the theft of numerous pieces of electronic equipment. Moreover, one of the
women found in trailer 14 along with Defendant was Ashley Drake. R52930; State's Exhibit 38. Although the recipient of the call was an unidentified
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woman, at one point during the call this unidentified woman called Ashley
from another phone and put the two phones together so that Defendant
could talk to Ashley.

R554.

Defendant and Ashley briefly spoke and

discussed what had occurred at the trailer park.

Id.

Thus, during this

phone call Defendant spoke about what had occurred at the trailer park
with someone who had been there, referenced his role in the crime with his
statement that he told his homeboys to leave the electronics, and predicted
that he would be going to prison.

These statements constitute a tacit

confession that he was one of the perpetrators of the crime.
In sum, even absent Davis's identification, the evidence

of

Defendant's guilt is compelling: Defendant was the only individual found
in trailer 14 who matched the description given by Davis, and Davis

thereafter acknowledged his participation in the robbery in a telephone call
from jail. An innocent man sitting in jail on charges of aggravated robbery
and burglary does not agree that he "messed up," predict that he will spend
5 years in prison, and complain that his cohorts disregarded his instructions
not to take electronics- the items which allowed the police to track them
down.

Thus, even absent the alleged error, there is not a reasonable

probability that the jury would have had a reasonable doubt that Defendant
was one of the perpetrators of the March 12 robbery and burglary.
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Accordingly, Defendant also has not established prejudice arising from trial
counsel's allegedly deficient performance.
B.

Trial counsel's strategic decision not to challenge Detective
Torres's isolated and out-of-context statement placing
Defendant at the scene of the crime was not objectively
unreasonable.

Defendant argues that his trial counsel was also ineffective because he
did not object or move for a mistrial when Detective Torres mentioned that
he included Defendant's photograph in the photo array because the other
two defendants said he was there. Aplt. Br. 32-37. In a pretrial decision, the
judge had ruled that the codefendants' statements to police were
inadmissible at Defendant's trial. R46, 70-71. But during questioning about
the compilation of the photo array, Detective Torres referenced the
codefendants' statements that Defendant was there at the robbery. That
brief reference was the result of a misunderstanding of the prosecutor's
question and the prosecutor quickly clarified:
Prosecutor:

Okay. And the defense counsel mentioned hair,
goatee and white skin as the characteristics
discussed with Alex [Davis] during his
description before the lineup, correct?

Det. Torres:

Yes.

Prosecutor:

Aside from those, are there any other factors
other than just the shnilarity to the defendant
that guided you in selecting the lineup
photographs?
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Det. Torres:

As far as the other two defendants saying he
was there.

Prosecutor:

No. Let me - the - when you were picking the
photographs out -

Det. Torres:

Oh.

Prosecutor:

- was there any other information - you said
that Alex mentioned his hair, the goatee and the
fact that he was white -

Det. Torres:

Light skinned.

Prosecutor:

- this other individual. Was there any other
information that you used when you were
picking the photographs, other than saying does
this person - you already said this - does this
person look like Justin Craft?

Det. Torres:

I don't understand the question.

Prosecutor:

Did you look at any other features aside from
hair, goatee and white skin when you were
picking the lineup photos -

Det. Torres:

No.

Prosecutor:

Other than comparing them to the defendant
and seeing if they looked like the defendant?

Det. Torres:

No.

R551-52. Defendant's ineffectiveness challenge to trial counsel's handling of
the detective's reference fails under both prongs of the Strickland analysis.
1.

Defendant cannot prove deficient performance on this
record.

Defendant argues that trial counsel's failure to object to the
"improper hearsay evidence" and to move for a mish·ial was objectively

-38-

unreasonable "because of the prejudicial impact of the hearsay statement"
placing Defendant at the crime scene. Aplt. Br. 33. Although the record
reflects that trial counsel did not object or move for a mistrial when
Detective Torres made his statement, nothing in the record reveals why he
did not do so. Defendant assumes that by objecting to Torres's statement or
by moving for a mistrial, trial counsel would have been able to mitigate the
"improper and inflammatory" nature of the remark.

Aplt. Br. 34-35.

Nothing in the record supports such an assumption, and Defendant has not
sought a rule 23B remand to establish record support for his claim. See Utah
R. App. P. 23(b).

Absent record evidence to the contrary, Strickland requires this Court
to presume that counsel reasonably decided not to object because Torres' s
statement was isolated enough that counsel could forego an objection in
order to avoid drawing attention to the statement. Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689; see also Laffertt; v. State, 2007 UT 73, ljf26, 175 P.3d 530 (court presumes
counsel acted reasonably absent contrary evidence). Detective Torres made
the statement in the course of being questioned by the prosecutor as to the
factors that guided him in selecting the photographs to put in the lineup.
R551.

It is readily apparent that Detective Torres misunderstood the

prosecutor's question, and instead explained why Defendant's photograph
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was included in the array: "As far as the other two defendants saying he
was there." Id. As soon as Detective Torres made the statement, however,
the prosecutor intervened, explaining that he meant to ask whether there
were any identifying features other than hair, goatee, and white skin that
Detective Torres had used when picking out the lineup photos. R551-52.
Detective Torres proceeded to answer the question by explaining that there
were not, and the questioning moved on to Defendant's telephone call from
jail.

R552.

The prosecutor did not thereafter mention or use Detective

Torres's statement during the remainder of the trial, including during jury
insh·uctions and closing arguments.
In light of the brief and isolated nature of Detective Torres' s
comment, trial counsel's not objecting is entirely consistent with a strategic
determination that objecting would simply draw more attention to the
statement. Trial counsel could reasonably assume that, as the statement
was made out of context and the prosecutor immediately turned the
questioning back to the photo lineup, the statement would carry little, if
any, weight with the jury and that actively drawing the jury's attention to
the statement would damage his client's defense. See, e.g., State v. Arriaga,
2012 UT App 295,

~,r 23-24, 288 P.3d 588, 594 (concluding that counsel was

not ineffective in deciding not to seek admission of evidence regarding
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victim's involvement on drug charges, where admission of such evidence
would have called further attention to defendant's illegal drug activities);

State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, ,I 72, 125 P.3d 878 (concluding that counsel had
not been ineffective in withdrawing her objection to the admission of
irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial information as counsel "may have felt
that the objection was futile and chose not to object for strategic reasons
(such as not drawing attention to this unfortunate information)").

Strickland further requires this Court to presume that counsel
reasonably decided not to move for a mistrial. In light of the isolated nature
of Detective Torres's remark, it was unlikely the judge would have granted
a mistrial.

In "view of the practical necessity of avoiding mistrials and

getting litigation finished," a "trial court should not grant a mistrial except
where the circumstances are such as to reasonably indicate ... that a fair
trial cannot be had and that a mistrial is necessary to avoid injustice." State

v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, if46, 27 P.3d 1133 (quotations and citation
omitted). Moreover, Utah "case law amply reveals that a mistrial is not
required where an improper statement is not intentionally elicited, is made
in passing, and is relatively innocuous in light of all the testimony
presented." State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, if 40, 108 P.3d 730. In State v. Wach,
2001 UT 35, if if 44-46, 24 P.3d 948, for example, the supreme court held that a
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mistrial was not required after a witness violated a pretrial stipulation by
referring to the defendant's prior bad acts. The supreme court reasoned
that the statement was "not elicited by the prosecutor," was an "isolated,
off-hand remark buried in roughly 244 pages of testimony," and was "not
necessarily inflammatory." Id. at ~46. Thus, in this case trial counsel could
have reasonably concluded that it was unlikely the judge would have
granted a mistrial and that requesting one would simply have drawn
unwarranted attention to the remark.
Thus, because Defendant cannot show that "no reasonably competent
attorney would have acted similarly," Harvey v. Warden, 629 F.3d 1228, 1239
(11th Cir. 2011), the deficient performance claim fails.
2. Defendant cannot prove prejudice on this record.

Defendant also has not demonstrated prejudice. Even if trial counsel
could have successfully moved to exclude Detective Torres's statement,
there is not a reasonable probability that the ultimate result below would
have been more favorable to Defendant. Given the brief and isolated nature
of Detective Torres' s remark, it is purely speculative that the jury gave any
weight at all to the remark during its deliberations. The remark was not
solicited by the prosecution and was made out of context. The prosecutor
did not reference the remark in closing argument, and no one mentioned it
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during jury instructions. See State v. Ashby, 2015 UT App 169, 147, 357 P.3d
554 (sending DVD of victim interview into deliberations not prejudicial
where the "record does not suggest that the jury actually played the DVD ..
. during its deliberations"); see also State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, 154, 299 P.3d
892 (failing to admonish jury not prejudicial where "there is nothing in the
record to indicate that the failures to admonish played any role in the juror's
conduct"). There is no reasonable likelihood that Detective Torres' s brief
and isolated remark so influenced the jury that it would have acquitted
Defendant had trial counsel successfully moved to exclude the statement.
Moreover, as discussed, Detective Torres's isolated statement could not
have been prejudicial in light of the other inculpatory evidence in the
record, namely the highly incriminating nature of the statements made by
Defendant in his jail telephone call and the fact that Defendant was the only
individual found in trailer 14 who matched the description given by Davis.

See supra, at 35-39.
C.

Defendant has not shown cumulative error.

Finally, Defendant also asks for relief under the cumulative error
doctrine. Aplt. Br. 37-38. This Court reverses for cumulative error only if
"the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines [its] confidence ...
that a fair trial was had." Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ,I25 (quotations and citation
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omitted). For the reasons explained above, there was no error, let alone
prejudicial error, in this case- either individually or cumulatively. And in
any case, even absent both Davis's identification and Detective Torres' s
brief reference to the codefendants' statement placing Defendant at the
scene, there was not a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Given
the evidence from the jail phone call, together with the fact that Defendant
was the only individual found in trailer 14 who matched the description
given by Davis, it cannot be said that the alleged errors of counsel were
such as "to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694. Accordingly, Defendant cannot establish prejudice arising from trial
counsel's allegedly deficient performances in challenging the admissibility
of Davis's eyewitness identifications and in not challenging Detective
Torres' s brief and isolated statement placing Defendant at the scene of the
crime.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR IN
PERMITTING
THE
JURY
TO
CONSIDER
THE
AGGRAVATED
ROBBERY
AND
AGGRAVATED
BURGLARY CHARGES

In his final claim on appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was
insufficient to support his convictions where it consisted only of "two
unreliable eyewitness identifications of [him], an improperly admitted co-
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defendant hearsay statement, and an ambiguous jail phone call." Aplt.Br.
38. This claim too fails first, because it is unpreserved, and second, because
the evidence was sufficient in any event.
A.

Defendant has not preserved his insufficiency claim.

To preserve a claim for appeal, a party must make a timely objection
specific enough to alert the trial court of the alleged error and to give it the
opportunity to correct the error. State v. Garner, 2008 UT App 32,
P.3d 637, cert. denied, 189 P.3d 1276 (Utah 2008).

,r 11, 177

The preservation rule

prevents defendants from strategically forgoing an objection in the hope of
obtaining an acquittal and then arguing for reversal on appeal when that
strategy fails. State v. King, 2006 UT 3,

,r 13, 131 P.3d 202.

This rule applies

to all claims, including constitutional questions and sufficiency-of-theevidence challenges. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,

,r 11, 10 P.3d 346.

This is especially true in the context of a directed verdict motion
based on insufficient evidence. A 1notion that generally asserts that the
evidence is insufficient, but fails "to assert the specific argument raised on
appeal ... is insufficient to preserve the more specific argument for appeal."

State v. Bosquez, 2012 UT App 89, if 8, 275 P.3d 1032 (citing State v. Patrick,
2009 UT App 226,

,r,r 15-16, 217 P.3d 1150).

Thus, in a DUI prosecution, a

directed verdict motion asserting only that "the State ha[d] failed to m[eet]
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its burden of the element of actual physical control of a vehicle" was not
sufficiently specific to preserve an appellate argument that the evidence of
physical control was insufficient because Defendant was allegedly living in
his car. Id.

,r 9 (alterations in original).

As this Court concluded in Bosquez,

"[b]roadly challenging one of the elements of the charge is insufficient to
preserve for appeal any and every argument that could possibly relate to
that element." Id.

,r 10.

This Court reached the same conclusion in State v. Noor, 2012 UT App
187,

~~

5-8, 283 P.3d 543. Noor's counsel stated only that he moved "for a

directed verdict of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence." Id.

,r

7.

That general motion, however, did not preserve an appellate challenge that
Noor's "cultural background, intoxication, and difficulties understanding
English rendered him unable to form the requisite intent" "to commit
forcible sexual abuse or lewdness." Id.

,r 6-7.

Defense counsel here made a perfunctory directed verdict motion that
lacked the specificity necessary to preserve his current appellate arguments.
After the State rested, counsel stated only that he was moving for a directed
verdict of acquittal on all charges "just on the basis that they haven't shown
the standard required of directed verdict that my client is the one that
committed these crimes.

And I'll submit it on that."
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R.558.

Counsel's

nonspecific, perfunctory motion did not alert the trial court to the alleged
deficiencies in the evidence that Defendant now argues. His arguments are
therefore unpreserved, and this Court will not address them absent a
showing of an exception to the preservation rule, such as plain error or
exceptional circumstances. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74,

iJ 11.

Defendant asserts his sufficiency challenges were preserved and thus
argues as if they were. See Aplt. Br. at 38-48. It is only at the end of his
argument that he acknowledges the possibility that these claims were
unpreserved. Id. at 47-48. He then asserts that this Court may nonetheless
review his sufficiency challenges for plain error, but provides nothing more
in support than citation to the plain error standard and conclusory
statements that he meets that standard. Id. Defendant completely fails to
analyze his insufficiency claim through the lens of those standards. Such
inadequate briefing falls far short of satisfying Defendant's burden to show
obvious error. See State v. Nelson, 2015 UT 62,

iJ

40, 355 P.3d 1031 ("Bald

assertions and platitudes are not enough to satisfy an appellant's burden to
provide an adequate argmnent on appeal.").
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B.

Defendant has not shown that the evidence was insufficient
to support his convicti_ons, much less that any insufficiency
was obvious and fundamental.

Because Defendant has not adequately briefed his plain error claim,
he "has failed to carry his burden of persuasion." See State v. Roberts, 2015
UT 24,

,r

20, 345 P.3d 1226. As stated above, to establish plain error in a

sufficiency challenge, Defendant must show: (1) that the evidence viewed in
the light most favorable to the jury's verdict was insufficient to support
conviction of the charged crime and (2) the insufficiency was "so obvious
and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the
jury." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ,r,r 17-18. Defendant has shown neither.
The crux of Defendant's sufficiency of the evidence challenge is his
argument that the eyewitness identifications were insufficient to place him
at the scene of the crime because they were unreliable under Ramirez. Aplt.
Br. 45-46. But although Defendant couches his challenge to the eyewitness
identifications as a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, he is in effect
challenging their constitutional admissibility. See id. In Ramirez, the Utah
Supreme Court adopted a state due process standard for analyzing
eyewitness identification evidence. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 779-81
(Utah 1991). Thus, the factors identified by the Court in Ramirez establish
"the analytical model to be used by a trial court in determining the

-48-

admissibility of arguably suggestive eyewitness identification."

Id.

Defendant's argument therefore essentially amounts to a challenge to the
admissibility of Davis's eyewitness identifications rather than to their
reliability once admitted. See, e.g., State v. Christensen, 2014 UT App 166,
,I15, 331 P.3d 1128 (holding that Christensen's argument was not properly

framed as sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge because once evidence is
admitted without objection, it is properly submitted to jury and relied
upon).
This Court should reject Defendant's attempt to resuscitate a Ramirez
objection that was not raised before the trial court by cloaking it as a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. As the United States Supreme
Court has explained, "a reviewing court" on a sufficiency claim "must
consider all of the evidence admitted by the trial court, regardless whether
that evidence was admitted erroneously." McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120,
131 (2010). Similarly, in State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342 (Utah 1980), the Utah
Supreme Court distinguished trial error - such as erroneous admission of
evidence - from evidentiary insufficiency because trial error concerned the
process by which the conviction was obtained, not a failure of proof. Id. at
347. Because trial error is essentially a failure of process, the remedy is
further process: "The state and the accused share the right to a fair, error-
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free determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused, and the double
jeopardy clause may not deny either side that right." Id. This is true even
where the exclusion of erroneously-admitted evidence seems to render the
evidence insufficient: "Where the appellate court holds admission of
evidence error, leaving insufficient evidence to support the conviction, it
would be difficult to determine what other evidence the prosecution might
have presented had it not succeeded in getting in the evidence which the
appellate court considers inadmissible." Id. at 347 n.23 (quotation omitted).
The same analysis applies to Defendant's challenge to Detective Torres's
isolated statement placing him at the scene of the crime, which is properly
viewed as a challenge to the admissibility of the statement, rather than as a
sufficiency of the evidence challenge. See Aplt. Br. 47.
In support of his insufficiency claim, Defendant notes that he was not
found in possession of the stolen items and that neither his fingerprints nor
DNA were found on items connected with the robbery. Aplt. Br. 44-45.
That is undoubtedly h·ue. But it is not necessary that a defendant be found
with the stolen goods in his possession before he can be convicted of a
robbery or burglary. Nor is it necessary that forensic evidence link him to
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the crimes. If that were the case, few crimes would result in conviction. 10
Indeed, a reviewing court does "not ... measure the sufficiency of the
evidence against a hypothetical-CS! based-investigative ideal. Instead of
imagining the evidence that might have been presented," reviewing courts
"consider the evidence that was presented, and evaluate its sufficiency
through a lens that gives the jury's verdict the benefit of all reasonable
inferences." State v. Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5,

if 53, 349 P.3d 664. Under this

standard, the evidence was more than sufficient to establish that Defendant
was one of the three men who committed the crime.
Davis gave a description of one of the perpetrators immediately after
the crime which 1natched only one individual found in trailer 14Defendant. Defendant made a telephone call from jail only five days after a
crime involving the theft of electronics in which he referenced the fact that
he would be spending time in prison and that he had warned his
"homeboys" not to take any electronics.
Moreover, Davis twice identified Defendant as one of the perpetrators
of the crime in his home. R:402, 546. Defendant claims that the eyewitness
identifications were insufficient to place Defendant at the scene of the crime
As Detective Torres explained at h·ial, no DNA testing or
fingerprinting was done on evidence in the case because the suspects had
been wearing gloves. R.551.
10
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because the circumstances surrounding Davis's eyewitness identifications of
Defendant were less than ideal. Aplt. Br. 45-46. But this argument 1nisses
the point. The jury credited that testimony- even after extensive testimony
from a defense expert, explaining how the limitations of human perception
and memory, as well as various aspects of the photo lineup conducted by
Detective Torres, could have rendered Davis's eyewitness identifications
unreliable.

R.562-77.

Once jurors are properly advised concerning the

potential problems with eyewitness identification- as they were in this
case-the question of whether such witnesses are credible is left to the jury.

See State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84,

1

36, 223 P.3d 1103 (expert testimony

concerning limitations of eyewitness testimony does not impinge on jury's
role as sole judge of witness credibility).

Accordingly, Defendant's

challenge to the credibility of Davis's eyewitness identifications fails as this
is a question left to the sole province of the jury. See Robbins, 2009 UT 23,

,r

19, 210 P.3d 288 (defendants cannot challenge testimony based on
"generalized concerns about a witness's credibility").
In sum, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the
evidence consisting of Davis's description of Defendant as one of the
perpetrators, the jail phone call, and Davis's eyewitness identifications of
Defendant, supports Defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery and
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aggravated burglary. That Defendant was a perpetrator of the March 12
crime was a permissible and reasonable conclusion from the evidence. And
Defendant certainly cannot show an insufficiency that "was so obvious and
fundamental that the trial court erred" by not catching it on its own. State v.

Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 117. His sufficiency of the evidence challenge thus
fails.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted on May 31, 2016.
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Addendum A

Addendum A

§ 76-6-203. Aggravated burglary, UT ST§ 76-6-203

--------·---···-·-- ----·-··-··· __________.._____ --·-· -------- --··-· -- ------------------···

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 6. Offenses Against Property
Part 2. Burglary and Criminal Trespass
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-203
§ 76-6-203. Aggravated burglary

Currentness
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in attempting. committing, or fleeing from a burglary the actor or another
participant in the crime:

(a) causes bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime;

(b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous weapon against any person who is not a participant in the crime; or

(c) possesses or attempts to use any explosive or dangerous weapon.

vi

(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony.

(3) As used in this section, "dangerous weapon" has the same definition as under Section 76-1-601.

VJ

Credits
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-203; Laws 1988, c. 174, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 6.

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-203, UT ST§ 76-6-203
Current through 2015 First Special Session
End or llorumcnl

'. ::OI h ·1 h,,m,on R,·ut,T, ~" d.tim to ,mginal I '.S. ( iu\·,·inm;;nt \h,rb

§ 76-6-302. Aggravated robbery, UT ST§ 76-6-302

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 6. Offenses Against Property
Part 3. Robbery
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-302
§ 76-6-302. Aggravated robbery

Currentness
(!) A person commits aggravated robbery ifin the course of committing robbery, he:

(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-60 l;

(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or

(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.

(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.

(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an
attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery.

v)

Credits
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-302; Laws 1975, c. 51, § I; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 7; Laws l 994, c. 271, § I; Laws 2003, c. 62. §
I, eff. May 5, 2003.

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-302, UT ST§ 76-6-302
Current through 2015 First Special Session
End or llocurnenl

